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I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, Anglo-American jurisprudence has been grounded by
the doctrine of stare decisis, which holds that similar cases should be
decided by similar legal principles rather than by the personal views of
an ever-changing judiciary. For if the law is not predictable, it can be
undermined as arbitrary and capricious. Nevertheless the passage of
years sometimes reveals a dynamic and changing common law that
requires reconsideration of prior judicial precedent. For if the law is not
flexible, it can be undermined as extreme.
There is an inherent tension in the law between predictability, on
the one hand, and flexibility, on the other. This tension is most vividly
on display when prior legal precedents confront new jurists who disagree
with them. Flexibility may demand a modification or overruling of such
precedent, but to do so may undermine legal relationships throughout
society that have been ordered by such precedent for years or decades.
This adjustment is no small matter. Overruling precedent to provide
justice in a particular case between particular parties may lead to turmoil
across a larger population that had ordered its affairs upon the decisions
of the past. Moreover, in states like Ohio where judges are elected, if all
that is needed to change the law is political control of the judiciary, then
whenever politics change, the law will change—complicating the lives
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of all members of society.
To successfully navigate between the poles of predictability and
flexibility, the judiciary needed a rule that weighed both—that neither
unduly limited the common law to the opinions of long gone jurists nor
commanded change simply because the judiciary had changed.
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor,1 and the majority that joined her,
may have brought Ohio such a rule in Westfield Insurance Co. v.
Galatis.2 Galatis provides that, to overrule existing precedent of the
Ohio Supreme Court, three factors must coalesce: (1) the Court must
conclude that “the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or changes
in circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision,
(2) the decision must defy practical workability, and (3) abandoning the
precedent would not create an undue hardship for those who have relied
upon it.”3 This Article explores the need for a doctrine permitting, but
limiting, the overruling of prior precedent; Ohio’s adoption of such a
rule; and whether the current standard will endure. To fully appreciate
the need for a rule that permits but also limits the overruling of prior
Supreme Court precedent, it is helpful to understand the historical
context in which the Galatis rule developed. Section II of this Article
discusses the political and ideological changes that swept the Ohio
judiciary in the early 1990s with the election of two new Justices to the
* Richard M. Garner is currently the Managing Partner of Davis & Young’s Columbus, Ohio,
Office where he focuses his practice on insurance coverage, appellate practice, and complex
litigation. He has handled over 60 cases in the Supreme Court of Ohio, including some of the most
important Ohio insurance cases in recent history. In 2003, he was selected as “Lawyer of the Year”
by Ohio Lawyers’ Weekly. Since 2005, he has yearly been named as a “Rising Star” or
“SuperLawyer” by Ohio Super Lawyers/Cincinnati Magazine and is “AV” rated by MartindaleHubbell. He is also listed in Best Lawyers in America® for insurance law. In 2007, the Ohio State
Bar Association certified him as an “Appellate Specialist.” From 2008 until 2013, he served as a
member of the Appellate Specialty Certification Board of the Ohio State Bar Association. Since
2008, he has also served on the Board of Trustees for the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys
(“OACTA”) and is active in various committees and positions. In 2013, he was awarded OACTA’s
“Outstanding Advocacy Award” for his handling of high profile insurance cases in Ohio. But this
biography would be remiss without special thanks to Lucas Baker, Davis & Young’s newest
associate, for his assistance in providing research for this article.
1. Throughout this article, I refer to Chief Justice O’Connor at various times as either
“Justice O’Connor” or “Chief Justice O’Connor” depending upon her position at the time of the
events being related. She became Chief Justice in 2011. Her full biography can be found online at
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, SUPREME CT. OF OHIO, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/
SCO/justices/oconnor/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 7, 2014).
2. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256. I
had the privilege of serving as counsel for the prevailing insurer in Galatis, which, despite the case
caption, was not “Westfield Insurance Company” but rather “Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
(Travelers).” My now-deceased mentor and friend, Henry A. Hentemann, was my co-counsel. I am
much in his debt for many things, including my involvement in the case.
3. Id. at ¶ 48.
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Ohio Supreme Court. The new Justices quickly set about changing
Ohio’s legal landscape by striking down legislation and overruling
judicial precedent. Section III reveals that, within a decade, opposing
interests mobilized their political base leading to a new and different
political/ideological majority. Rather than undertake yet another revision
to Ohio’s judicial precedent, Chief Justice O’Connor and the new
majority crafted a new rule of stare decisis. This new rule promised to
mitigate the instability of such political changes, yet still allow changes
in the common law—providing both predictability and flexibility.
Section IV explores the durability of the Galatis rule for overruling prior
precedent of the Ohio Supreme Court. The question is: will it last?
The full historical context is much richer than such a short article
can describe, but I hope to provide an accurate snapshot of that
particular part with which I am well familiar.
II. A CHANGING JUDICIARY CHANGES THE LAW
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Ohio underwent one of its periodic
political shakeups as Justices Francis Sweeney and Paul Pfeifer joined
sitting Justices Andrew Douglas and Alice Robie Resnick on the high
court. Together, the Justices formed one of the most potent 4-3 voting
blocks in recent history. Over the next decade, these four Justices deeply
impacted Ohio insurance law—particularly in the area of
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage.4
Among their decisions were the following:
 In 1993, they held that certain anti-stacking provisions
were unenforceable and revised the manner in which setoff
of tortfeasor liability provisions were interpreted.5
 In 1994, they held that insurers could not exclude UM/UIM
coverage for non-covered automobiles.6
 In 1996, they retroactively invalidated most rejections of
4. Their reach went beyond insurance law and extended to such areas as tort reform and
public school financing (in which the high court demanded a $1 billion-plus reorganization of state
school funding). See JONATHAN H. ADLER & CHRISTINA M. ADLER, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, A MORE
MODEST COURT: THE OHIO SUPREME COURT’S NEWFOUND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 3 (2008),
available at https://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/a-more-modest-court-the-ohio-supremecourts-newfound-judicial-restraint.
5. See Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ohio 1993). For a more
detailed look at Savoie, see Matthew Devery McCormack, Comment, Tracking Ohio Insurance
Coverage: The Genesis and Demise of Savoie, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 293 (1994).
6. See Martin v. Midwestern Grp. Ins. Co., 639 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ohio 1994). For a more
detailed look at Martin, see Alan E. Mazur, Note, Martin v. Midwestern Group Insurance Co.:
Something For Nothing, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 667 (1995).
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UM/UIM coverage by creating extra-statutory UM/UIM
offer requirements.7
 In 1999:
 they held that general liability policies could
provide UM/UIM coverage by operation of law
thereby extending the application of Ohio’s
UM/UIM statute beyond traditional automobile
liability policies;8 and
 in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
they held that standard commercial automobile
policies provided UM/UIM coverage to employees
and their residential family at all times, regardless
of whether they were in a vehicle owned by their
employer or performing work for that employer.9
 In 2000:
 they again retroactively invalidated most rejections
of UM/UIM coverage by creating additional extrastatutory offer elements;10 and
 they held that insurers could not limit UM/UIM
coverage to insureds who had actually suffered
bodily injury, but must extend such coverage for
loss of consortium claims even though the Ohio
General Assembly had ostensibly amended Ohio’s
UM/UIM statute to permit such limitations in
1994.11
These cases were particularly vexing for insurers for a variety of
reasons, the most important of which were that the cases often overruled
recent judicial precedent12 and the cases were retrospective in

7. See Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Grp., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Ohio 1996).
8. See Selander v. Erie Ins. Grp., 709 N.E.2d 1161, 1165 (Ohio 1999).
9. See Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 710 N.E.2d 1116, 1119-20 (Ohio 1999);
see also Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am., 715 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio 1999)
(following Scott-Pontzer).
10. See Linko v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 739 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ohio 2000). For the Ohio
Department of Insurance’s summary of the Scott-Pontzer and Linko decisions and their impact, see
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN
OHIO: REPORT REQUIRED BY SENATE BILL 97, at 2-4 (2003) [hereinafter “UM/UIM Report”],
available at http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Legal/Reports/Documents/Senate_Bill_97_Report.pdf.
11. See More v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 723 N.E.2d 97, 101-02 (Ohio 2000).
12. See Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ohio 1993) (overruling State
Farm Auto Ins. Co. v. Rose, 575 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio 1991) and Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., 545
N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1989)); Martin v. Midwestern Grp. Ins. Co., 639 N.E.2d 438, 441-42 (Ohio 1994)
(overruling Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 488 N.E.2d 840 (Ohio 1986)).
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application.13 At the time, Ohio had a 15-year statute of limitations on
related actions, which allowed a great many “closed” personal injury
files to be “resurrected.”14 This triggered a huge increase in the number
of UM/UIM claims. First, virtually all UM/UIM rejections were
retroactively invalidated, thus driving up the number of claims. Next,
because the commercial UM/UIM coverage was expanded, more
claimants were considered “underinsured.” This was due to the fact that
personal auto policy limits of tortfeasors were usually much less than the
limits of commercial UM/UIM coverage.15 Further, UM/UIM insurers
were more likely to require claimants to make claims with other
triggered UM/UIM insurance to seek the benefit of other insurance
provisions.16
These problems had a dramatic effect on the insurance industry. By
2001, insurance industry observers were estimating that the 1999 ScottPontzer decision alone had cost insurers over $1.5 billion.17 To put this
in context, after only two years and with no end in sight, Scott-Pontzer
alone had compelled insurers to pay about twice the damage reported to
have been suffered as a result of Hurricane Irene (which also occurred in
1999).18 After 2000, the Ohio Department of Insurance reported that
commercial UM/UIM rates increased by an average of 170%.19
With such money flowing, it was predictable that UM/UIM
litigation activity would increase. Ohio’s courts of common pleas were
the frontline for the corresponding litigation explosion. From 1999 to
2003, these courts saw related new civil case filings increase nearly

13. See Ross v. Farmers Ins. Grp. of Cos., 695 N.E.2d 732, 738 (Ohio 1998) (noting the
general rule regarding retroactivity established in Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers, 129 N.E.2d 467,
468 (Ohio 1955)).
14. See UM/UIM REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
15. See Clark v. Scarpelli, 744 N.E.2d 719, 724 (Ohio 2001); see also UM/UIM REPORT,
supra note 10, at 2-3. At the time, state minimum financial responsibility limits in Ohio were
$12,500 per person and $25,000 per accident while commercial UM/UIM coverage was often
provided at limits of greater than $500,000 per accident. Matthew J. Cavanaugh, Slamming the Lid
on Pandora’s Box: How the Ohio Legislature Compensated the Insurance Industry for ScottPontzer at the Expense of Ohio Drivers, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1023-26 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Halliwill v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 21488, 2003-Ohio-6809, at ¶¶ 2-4 (Ct.
App. Dec. 17, 2003); Justus v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 02AP-1222, 2003-Ohio-3913, at ¶¶ 1-14 (Ct.
App. July 22, 2003).
17. See, e.g., Gibson v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 178 F. Supp. 2d 921, 922 n.1 (S.D. Ohio
2001). I have not seen reliable estimates on the combined costs of the other decisions.
18. LIXION A. AVILA, NATIONAL HURRICANE CTR., PRELIMINARY REPORT: HURRICANE
IRENE 13-19 OCTOBER, 1999, at 3 (1999), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
data/tcr/AL131999_Irene.pdf.
19. See UM/UIM REPORT, supra note 10, at 6.
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20%.20 Ohio’s intermediate courts of appeals saw new civil case filings
increase nearly 10% during the same timeframe.21 By 2003, the Ohio
Supreme Court had over 100 related appeals pending, addressing various
nuances of the Scott-Pontzer phenomenon.22
Tension within the legislature also increased. In the seven years
between 1994 and 2001, the Ohio General Assembly amended Ohio’s
UM/UIM statute23 five times in a race to keep up with the
pronouncements flowing from Ohio’s high court.24 This contest
culminated in the 2001 Senate Bill 97 amendments, which eliminated
mandatory offers of UM/UIM coverage and precluded the possibility of
judicial imposition of UM/UIM coverage “by operation of law.”25

20. See generally THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, THE OHIO COURTS SUMMARY (19992003), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/default.asp. The Ohio Supreme
Court reports the following categories for common pleas courts: professional tort, product liability,
other torts, workers compensation, foreclosures, administrative appeals, complex litigation, other
civil and criminal. UM/UIM cases were not individually tracked, so the percentages were obtained
by comparing the combined “other torts” and “other civil” categories by year. There could be other
reasons for spikes in filings (for example, House Bill 350 tort reform in 1997), but none was
apparent from the data for 1999 to 2003.
21. See id. The Ohio Supreme Court does not report civil appeals by category. Accordingly,
the percentages were obtained by simply comparing the “new cases filed” by year.
22. In re Uninsured & Underinsured Motorists Coverage Cases, 100 Ohio St. 3d 302, 2003Ohio-5888, 798 N.E.2d 1077.
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 140 and Statewide
Issue 1 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)).
24. See id. The amendments included: 2001 S 97, eff. 10-31-01; 2000 S 267, eff. 9-21-00;
1999 S 57, eff. 11-2-99; 1997 H 261, eff. 9-3-97; 1994 S 20, eff. 10-20-94.
25. S.B. 97, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001). The uncodified provisions of S.B.
97 provide, in pertinent part, that the General Assembly’s intent was the following:
(B) Express the public policy of the state to:
(1) Eliminate any requirement of the mandatory offer of uninsured motorist coverage,
underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages;
(2) Eliminate the possibility of uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages being implied as a matter
of law in any insurance policy;
...
(4) Eliminate any requirement of a written offer, selection, or rejection form for uninsured, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverages from any transaction for an insurance policy;
...
(E) To supersede the holdings of the Ohio Supreme Court in [Linko v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of N. America] (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 445, [Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mutual
Fire Insurance Co.] (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660 . . . [Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc.] (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 565, and their progeny.
Despite dire predictions that S.B. 97 would cause a “race to the bottom,” in which insurers sought to
avoid providing UM/UIM altogether, the Ohio Department of Insurance reports that the percentage
of policies providing UM/UIM coverage remained “fairly stable” following S.B. 97. UM/UIM
REPORT, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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All of the foregoing suggested that a political change might be
coming to the Ohio Supreme Court. And in 2003, it did.
In 2002, Justice Douglas retired. In the wake of his retirement,
Maureen O’Connor, who was a common pleas court judge when the
UM/UIM phenomenon began, was elected to the Ohio Supreme Court.26
She joined the high court in January 2003.27 With Chief Justice Thomas
Moyer, Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, and Justice Deborah Cook,
there was apparently a new 4-3 conservative majority on the Ohio
Supreme Court.28 The question quickly arose: did a new conservative
majority on the high court mean that the recent UM/UIM decisions
would be short-lived? The question was fully engaged in Galatis.
Galatis arose from a fatal traffic accident that occurred a decade
prior.29 The decedent’s family had long since settled with the tortfeasor
and their personal UM/UIM insurers.30 After Scott-Pontzer was decided,
however, a plaintiff could—and these plaintiffs did—seek commercial
UM/UIM coverage from their employers’ policies even though the
accident had nothing to do with those employers.31 Both the trial court
and the court of appeals, for different reasons, rejected the resurrected
claims, and their lawyers appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.32
In July 2002, the high court accepted the appeal. During the
briefing, the insurer challenged whether Scott-Pontzer was a valid
statement of Ohio law, and the parties fully briefed the issue.33 The case
was argued in March 2003, and Ohioans would wait for the next eight
months to learn Scott-Pontzer’s fate.34 Galatis created a fairly strict
standard for overturning prior precedent of the Ohio Supreme Court—
one that attempted to serve the interests of predictability and stability of
prior precedents but also provide enough flexibility to permit
overturning prior precedent to prevent unnecessary rigidity in Ohio law.
Under this standard, the Galatis Court limited the Scott-Pontzer decision

26. See ADLER & ADLER, supra note 4, at 5.
27. See generally Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, supra note 1. Later that year, Justice
Terrence O’Donnell replaced Justice Cook. In 2005, Justice Judith Lanzinger replaced Justice
Sweeney. In 2007, Justice Robert Cupp replaced Justice Resnick. See ADLER & ADLER, supra note
4, at 4. After 2007, of the four Justices who began this article, only Justice Pfeifer remains.
28. See ADLER & ADLER, supra note 4, at 4.
29. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶
3.
30. Id.
31. Id. at ¶ 4.
32. Id. at ¶¶ 6-8.
33. Id. at ¶¶ 70-74 (Resnick, J., dissenting)
34. Galatis was decided on November 5, 2003.
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and overruled a companion case.35
III. FLEXIBILITY PREDICTABILITY: OHIO’S NEW STARE DECISIS RULE
From the standpoint of conservatives, the political problem is
always that conservative judges are less likely to reverse precedent than
judges who are considered activist. This general, very unscientific
observation was on display when Chief Justice Earl Warren retired from
the United States Supreme Court in 1969. Questions then arose, asking
whether a new Nixon-appointed conservative majority might wipe away
many landmark decisions of the Warren Court. It was then observed,
that the newly appointed conservatives would feel constrained, under
principles including stare decisis, to adhere to the more liberal decisions
of the Warren Court:
If the Warren Court’s reforms were paraded back before them, the
erstwhile dissenters might feel bound by the doctrine of stare decisis
(stand by settled cases) and would not be willing to discard them so
soon.
In fact, the “strict constructionists” that Mr. Nixon admires are the
least likely agents of constitutional upheaval. Justice Harlan, who dissented against most of the landmark liberal cases, believes so strongly
in stare decisis that he has recently written a few liberal decisions himself—and has been chided by Justice Hugo Black for hobbling law en36
forcement.

Accordingly, there was concern in Ohio that, even if Scott-Pontzer was
poorly decided and demonstrably unmanageable, Ohio’s new
conservative majority might be reluctant to overrule it.
Chief Justice Moyer, for one, had long been a strong advocate of
stare decisis. His 1993 dissenting opinion in Gallimore v. Children’s
Hospital Medical Center expressed his views on the subject well—that
the certainty, uniformity, and continuity of law wrought by stare decisis
should be protected:
Blackstone said it in his Commentaries when he observed,
“[p]recedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust[.]” . . .
Oliver Wendell Holmes said it in Summary of Events (1873), 7
Am.L.J. 579, when he observed, “We sincerely hope that the editors
35. See id. at ¶¶ 61-62.
36. Jon D. Noland, Stare Decisis and the Overruling of Constitutional Decisions in the
Warren Years, 4 VAL. U. L. REV. 101, 101 (1969) (quoting another source).
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[of the American Civil Law Journal] will fail in their expressed desire
to diminish the weight of precedents with our courts. We believe the
weight attached to them is about the best thing in our whole system of
law.”
Benjamin N. Cardozo said it in The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928)
29-30: “What has once been settled by a precedent will not be unsettled overnight, for certainty and uniformity are gains not lightly to be
sacrificed. Above all is this true when honest men have shaped their
conduct upon the faith of the pronouncement.” And Felix Frankfurter
in Helvering v. Hallock (1940), 309 U.S. 106, 119 . . . said, “We recognized that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic
need to satisfy reasonable expectations.”
These statements regarding stare decisis need no elaboration except to
say that they enunciate a fundamental element of American jurispru37
dence—consistency and predictability.

Indeed, although Chief Justice Moyer had dissented in ScottPontzer,38 his adherence to the principle of stare decisis had caused him
to apply Scott-Pontzer as binding legal precedent in multiple subsequent
decisions.39 Moreover, his earlier opinion in King v. Nationwide
Insurance Co.40 had ostensibly formed the analytical foundation for
Scott-Pontzer.41 Thus, it was by no means clear that Chief Justice Moyer
would join any “new conservative majority” in overruling ScottPontzer.42 If the new majority were to tackle the vexing problems
created by Scott-Pontzer and related UM/UIM decisions, the issue of
stare decisis would be front and center.43
37. Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1062 (Ohio 1992) (Moyer,
C.J., dissenting).
38. Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 710 N.E.2d 1116, 1122 (Ohio 1999) (Moyer,
C.J., dissenting).
39. See Bagnoli v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 715 N.E.2d 125, 126 (Ohio 1999);
Estate of Dillard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 715 N.E.2d 126, 126; Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. of Am., 715 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio 1999).
40. King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 519 N.E.2d 1380 (Ohio 1988).
41. See Scott-Pontzer, 710 N.E.2d at 1119 (citing King, 519 N.E.2d at 1380).
42. Adding to the uncertainty of court observers was the fact that Justice Cook had recently
been nominated to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and, therefore, would not
participate in the Galatis decision. Instead, Judge Mary DeGenaro of Ohio’s Seventh Appellate
District was appointed to sit for Justice Cook. SeeWestfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216,
2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, at ¶¶ 63-64.
43. Because this article deals with the doctrine of stare decisis in the Ohio Supreme Court, it
does not delve into related issues of the following: what constitutes judicial authority (see William
M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions: A
Critique, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 329-34 (1985)); determination of when judicial precedent should be
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At first glance, notwithstanding “rhetoric” such as that in Chief
Justice Moyer’s Gallimore dissent, the doctrine of stare decisis might
seem to be no more than a minor inconvenience to overruling ScottPontzer. After all, some may ask, since political change had come to the
Ohio Supreme Court, should not a legal change follow? Throughout the
history of Ohio and the Republic, legal commentators have noted
periods of political or cultural change in which the influence of stare
decisis on decision-making seemed stronger, and other periods when its
influence appeared weaker.44 The popular view may be that the doctrine
is only invoked to stave off political change until such time as the
faction out of power can orchestrate a return to decision-making power.
However, the history and philosophy of the doctrine reveal a deeper,
richer doctrine, which many conservative judges view as an organic part
of the common law.
While one can trace the roots of the doctrine back for millennia, a
practical analysis of its present manifestation is best begun with the
Anglo-American experience of the 18th century. Blackstone considered
the doctrine under the heading, “Of the Laws of England.”45 He divided
the civil law of England into lex non scripta (unwritten common law)
and lex scripta (written or statutory law).46 The former was generally
comprised of longstanding “customs” which were tacito et illeterato
hominum consensus et moribus expressum, that is, expressed by the
silent and unwritten consent of men.47 Such customs had to be
longstanding, continuous, undisputed, reasonable, certain, compulsory,
and consistent.48 Of course, the question arose as to how these customs
were to be determined, made known, and validated. Blackstone
responded that written judicial decisions were the best evidence of such
customs:
And indeed these judicial decisions are the principal and most authoriapplied prospectively rather than retrospectively (see DiCenzo v. A Best Products Co., Inc., 120
Ohio St. 3d 149, 2008-Ohio-5327, 897 N.E.2d 132, at paragraph one of the syllabus); or the
relation, interaction, and differences between other limiting doctrines such as “law of the case” and
res judicata/collateral estoppel (see Grava v. Parkman Twp., 653 N.E.2d 226, 227 (Ohio 1995);
Nolan v. Nolan, 462 N.E.2d 410, 412 (Ohio 1984)).
44. See Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1941); William
O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 739 (1949); Robert D. Archibald, Stare Decisis
and the Ohio Supreme Court, 9 W. RES. L. REV. 23, 34 (1957-1958); Noland, supra note 36, at 11821; John Wallace, Comment, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision of Activism,
Passivism, and Politics in Casey, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 187, 201-08 (1994).
45. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *63.
46. Id.
47. See id. at *64.
48. See id. at *76-78.
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tative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a custom as
shall form a part of the common law. The judgment itself, and all the
proceedings previous thereto, are carefully registered and preserved,
under the name of records, in public repositories set apart for that particular purpose; and to them frequent recourse is had, when any critical
question arises, in the determination of which former precedents may
give light or assistance . . . . For it is an established rule to abide by
former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation; as
well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge’s opinion; as also because the law in that
case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it
is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws
and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to
49
maintain and expound the old one.

Once rendered, such “precedents and rules must be followed, unless
flatly absurd or unjust.”50 Where change was required because the
precedent was “absurd or unjust,” Blackstone concluded, the change was
made because the prior statements had not, in fact, been “the law” or
“custom” at all, but had, instead, been adopted in error:
[T]he subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the
former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that
such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not the law; that is, that it
is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously de51
termined.

When such processes are followed, then “we may take it as a
general rule, ‘that the decisions of the courts of justice are the evidence
of what is common law’” and “this internal evidence of freedom along
with it, that it probably was introduced by the voluntary consent of the
people.”52 Thus, the judiciary did not create the “customs” upon which
49. Id. at *69.
50. Id. at *70.
51. Id. Ohio currently follows a form of this rule, known as the “Peerless Doctrine.” See
Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers, 129 N.E.2d 467, 468 (Ohio 1955) (“The general rule is that a decision
of a court of supreme court jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation,
and the effect is not that the former was bad law, but that it never was the law.”). See also Ross v.
Farmers Ins. Grp. of Cos., 695 N.E.2d 732, 737 (Ohio 1998) (following Peerless); Harper v. Va.
Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-97 (1993) (applying similar doctrine under federal law).
52. BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *71, *74.
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the common law was based, but rather observed and recorded those
customs as “common law.”53
This view was carried into the American experience in the
following decades. When the various attributes of a federal constitution
were being considered, it was observed that if courts were endowed with
positive power to make the law, as well as interpret it, personal freedom
would be endangered: for “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be
not separated from the legislative and executive powers.”54 Of the
several limitations inherent in the nature of judicial power was the
doctrine of stare decisis: “To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts,
it is indispensable that they should be bound by strict rules and
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every
particular case that comes before them.”55 For this and other reasons, it
was argued that “the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution;
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”56 Lifetime
judicial appointments were championed in order to insulate the judiciary
from political pressure and to allow “long and laborious study to acquire
competent knowledge” of judicial precedent.57 Courts were to declare
“judgment” rather than “will” (which was left to the legislative and
executive branches).58 Accordingly, it was often difficult to separate the
doctrine of stare decisis from the doctrine of separation of powers.
However, scholars later noted that the American experience with
the doctrine was decidedly more relaxed than what was described by
Blackstone or Hamilton.59 American judges claimed exceptions to the

53. As Pound observed in the mid-20th century:
Rightly understood, stare decisis is a feature of the common-law technique of decision . . . . The common-law technique is based on a conception of law as experience developed by reason and reason tested and developed by experience. It is a technique of
finding the grounds of decision in recorded judicial experience, making for stability by
requiring adherence to decision of the same question in the past, allowing growth and
change by the freedom of choice from competing analogies of equal authority when new
questions arise or old ones take on new forms.
Pound, supra note 44, at 5-6.
54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 394 (Alexander Hamilton).
55. Id. at 399.
56. Id. at 393.
57. Id. at 399.
58. Id. at 396. Later legal commentators observed that the judiciary’s legitimacy would be
measured by whether it could “demonstrate in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived”
from existing law rather than “merely impos[ing] its own value choices.” Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principals and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971).
59. See Noland, supra note 36, at 102-03.
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doctrine ranging from judicial discretion to the “spirit of the times”60 and
even “a personal matter for each judge who assumes” a “sacred oath” to
uphold the Constitution.61 Echoing such sentiment, the majority opinion
in Gallimore, which had drawn Chief Justice Moyer’s strong dissent,
pronounced:
When the common law has been out of step with the times, and the
legislature, for whatever reason, has not acted, we have undertaken to
change the law and rightfully so. After all, who presides over the
common law but the courts? . . . The common law is not static. It is
dynamic, and it must continue to evolve to keep up with the times . . . .
Either the common law must be modernized to conform with present
day norms, or it will engender a lack of respect as being out of touch
62
with the realities of our time.

Judges were no longer simply recorders of the common law; they
had become fashioners of it. Such sentiment appears to be widely shared
in the American judiciary and held by many of its luminaries. For
instance, Oliver Wendell Holmes famously pronounced:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV . . . [especially] if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule
63
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.

Under such circumstances, Holmes noted all that was needed for change
was “appetite.”64 Of course, such sentiments did not make a very
practical rule of law. As Justice William O. Douglas later explained:
I do not suggest that stare decisis is so fragile a thing as to bow before
every wind. The law is not properly susceptible to whim or caprice. It
must have the sturdy qualities required of every framework that is designed for substantial structures. Moreover, it must have uniformity
when applied to the daily affairs of men.
Uniformity and continuity in law are necessary to many activities. If
they are not present, the integrity of contracts, wills, conveyances and
securities is impaired. And there will be no equal justice under law if a
negligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the afternoon. Stare
decisis provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange
60. Wallace, supra note 44, at 191.
61. City of Rocky River v. State Emp’t Relations Bd., 539 N.E.2d 103, 108 (Ohio 1989).
62. Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E. 2d 1052, 1059-60 (Ohio 1992).
63. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897);
Noland, supra note 36, at 103.
64. See Noland, supra note 36, at 103.
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their affairs with confidence. Stare decisis serves to take the capricious
65
element out of law and to give stability to a society.

Thus, the practical American experience with the doctrine of stare
decisis was shaped by two wings: the brooding predictability and
stability of Blackstone and Hamilton and the flexible, declaratory
impulses evidenced by the Gallimore majority. Both wings have been on
display at various times in various courts throughout the nation.
But returning to our Galatis storyline: which wing would prevail
when the Ohio Supreme Court considered the continued vitality of ScottPontzer? Eight months after oral argument, the Ohio Supreme Court
released its decision in Galatis, which was authored by Justice
O’Connor.66 In her opening paragraph, Justice O’Connor went directly
to the heart of the matter—the nature of stare decisis:
Stare decisis is the bedrock of the American judicial system. Wellreasoned opinions become controlling precedent, thus creating stability
and predictability in our legal system. It is only with great solemnity
and with the assurance that the newly chosen course for the law is a
significant improvement over the current course that we should depart
67
from precedent.

But while she noted that “this court is no stranger to overruling
precedent, we have not adopted a standard by which to judge whether a
past decision should be abandoned.”68 Such a standard would, hopefully,
marry the two wings of American stare decisis and provide predictable
flexibility for courts and litigants. Looking to precedent from the
Supreme Court of Michigan, Justice O’Connor provided the following
tripartite standard:
[I]n Ohio, a prior decision of the Supreme Court may be overruled
where (1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or changes in
circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision,
(2) the decision defies practical workability, and (3) abandoning the
precedent would not create an undue hardship for those who have re69
lied upon it.

65. Douglas, supra note 44, at 736.
66. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256.
67. Id. at ¶ 1.
68. Id. at ¶ 45 (footnotes omitted).
69. Id. at ¶ 48. The United States Supreme Court has not announced such a definitive rule,
but has looked to the same kinds of factors when considering whether to overrule precedent. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362-63 (2010).
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Importantly, the three factors are conjunctive—all must be met to justify
overruling judicial precedent.
Applying this standard to Scott-Pontzer, the majority concluded
that it must limit Scott-Pontzer, and must overrule Ezawa, its companion
case.70 First, the majority explained in detail that Scott-Pontzer was
wrongly decided at that time, because the Court had interpreted the
insurance contract in a manner that was inconsistent with longstanding
Ohio law.71 Second, the majority explained in detail that Scott-Pontzer
was unworkable and had “muddied the waters of insurance coverage
litigation, converted simple liability suits into complex multiparty
litigation, and created massive and widespread confusion—the antithesis
of what a decision of this court should do.”72 Finally, the majority
explained that there could be no legitimate reliance interests on the
continuance of Scott-Pontzer due to the nature of the claims and because
subsequent legislation had eliminated the claims moving forward.73
Chief Justice Moyer, one of those joining in the majority opinion,
also penned a separate concurring opinion to laud the new standard for
stare decisis, explaining:
The majority opinion . . . sets forth a tripartite standard that honors
stare decisis by preventing arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
the law while relieving courts of the obligation to apply stare decisis
with “petrifying rigidity.” . . . We serve the bench and the bar by
adopting a cogent, clear standard by which to test claims that our prec74
edents should not be followed.

IV. THE DURABILITY OF THE GALATIS STANDARD FOR STARE DECISIS
In the ensuing decade, the UM/UIM aspects of Galatis have faded
into the past, but the tripartite stare decisis test has, thus far, shown
lasting endurance. For example, in 2005, in State ex rel. International
Paper v. Trucinski,75 and in 2006, in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v.
70. See Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849 at ¶¶ 2, 49-63.
71. See id. at ¶¶ 9-42, 49.
72. Id. at ¶¶ 50-57.
73. See id. at ¶¶ 58-60.
74. Id. at ¶ 66 (Moyer, C.J., concurring). It may well be that without the clear standard, Chief
Justice Moyer may not have joined the majority. Ironically, the dissenters apparently discovered a
newfound respect for the doctrine of stare decisis and argued vociferously that Scott-Pontzer should
not be overruled. See id. at ¶¶ 75-101. But it has likely always been thus. Sixty-five years ago,
Justice William O. Douglas observed: “Today’s new and startling decision quickly becomes a
coveted anchorage for new vested interests. The former proponents of change acquire an acute
conservatism in their new status quo.” Douglas, supra note 44, at 737.
75. See State ex rel. Int’l Paper v. Trucinski, 106 Ohio St. 3d 203, 2005-Ohio-4557, 833
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CompManagement, Inc.,76 the Galatis tripartite test was applied to
uphold existing precedent and reject calls for a new law.
In 2008, in Groch v. General Motors Corp.,77 Justice O’Connor
authored another majority opinion that presented the opportunity to
juxtapose the Galatis tripartite test against the manner in which the Ohio
Supreme Court formerly addressed stare decisis. Groch involved
questions certified from a federal district court involving the
constitutionality of several statutes.78 One was a statute of repose.79
Ohio’s high court had recently issued two conflicting decisions related to
the question: Sedar v. Knowlton Construction Co. (which found a
similar provision constitutional)80 and Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co.
(overruling Sedar and finding a similar provision unconstitutional).81
Justice O’Connor explained the history and rationale of Sedar, the
analysis of Brennaman’s overruling of Sedar just four years later, and
the Galatis tripartite test82:
The explicit purpose of the Galatis test, which was developed after
Brennaman was decided, is to provide a “well-structured method of
ensuring a disciplined approach to deciding whether to abandon a
precedent.” . . . Brennaman illustrates the pitfalls of a court’s application of an unstructured approach to overruling a precedent.
Although Sedar was a thorough and concise opinion that fully sustained each of its specific conclusions with extensive reasoning, Brennaman is the classic example of the “arbitrary administration of justice” that Galatis cautions against.

N.E.2d 728, at ¶¶ 5-15. International Paper was attempting to challenge the claimant’s permanent
total disability (PTD) award and asked the Court to overrule State ex rel. Thomas v. Indus. Comm.
and to vacate the claimant’s PTD award. The Court found that the Galatis tripartite test was not
satisfied and therefore declined to overrule Thomas. Id. at ¶ 3.
76. See Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. CompManagement, Inc., 111 Ohio St. 3d 444, 2006-Ohio6108, 857 N.E.2d 95, at ¶ 16. Cleveland Bar Association argued that CompManagement was
wrongly decided. However, Cleveland Bar Association failed to satisfy the Galatis tripartite test,
and the Court refused to overturn precedent. Id. at ¶ 21.
77. Groch v. General Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St. 3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, at
¶¶ 132-38 (2008).
78. See id. at ¶¶ 11-20.
79. See id. at ¶ 94.
80. See Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co., 551 N.E.2d 938, 949 (Ohio 1990). The issue before
the Court was whether a ten-year statute of repose that applied to architects, construction
contractors, and others who supply similar services was constitutional. Id. at 940. The Court found
the provision was constitutional. Id. at 949.
81. See Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ohio 1994). The Court addressed
the same issue of the ten-year statute of repose that was ruled on in Sedar. Id. at 430. However, this
time the Court found that the provision was unconstitutional. Id. at 430-31.
82. See Groch, 2008-Ohio-546 at ¶¶ 108-54.
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Brennaman cavalierly overruled Sedar with virtually no analysis. In
the process Brennaman failed to accord proper respect to the principle
of stare decisis . . . . Brennaman illustrates why it is imperative that the
Galatis factors be applied. Otherwise, the principles of predictability
83
and stability are sacrificed for the sake of personal judicial whims.

Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Groch did not
overrule Brennaman but simply limited it to its facts—application to a
different statute of repose.84
In a signal that perhaps Galatis strikes the right balancing test
between predictability and flexibility, Justice O’Connor’s majority
opinion in Groch drew concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice
Lanzinger, who joined the high court in 2005, authored a concurring
opinion to Groch, in which she questioned “the continued vitality” of
Galatis if it was going to be used to leave Brennaman intact “instead of
forthrightly overruling a bad precedent.”85
On the other hand, Justice Pfeifer, who had written the majority
opinion in Brennaman, queried how Brennaman could have “morphed
from a case worthy of citation . . . to an object of derision” in such a
short time.86 He then criticized the breadth of stare decisis as set forth in
Galatis, suggesting that the Galatis standard is too restrictive to allow
precedent to be simply overruled: “Or is the majority simply forced to
insult this court’s work in Brennaman because it has no basis to overrule
it given the ‘judicial straitjacket’ the majority zipped itself into in
Galatis?”87
Thus, those Justices who desire to expressly overrule precedent and
also those who desire to affirm it claim to find fault in Galatis. Perhaps
that is as it should be.
While the individual Justices grapple with the application of
Galatis to specific cases, the Ohio Supreme Court seems to have carved
out at least three broad topical exceptions to strict application of the
Galatis tripartite test.
First, in State v. Silverman, a majority of the court, including
Justice O’Connor, held that the Galatis tripartite test was inapplicable to
83. Id. at ¶¶ 135-37.
84. See id. at ¶ 147.
85. Id. at ¶ 219 (Lanzinger, J., concurring). Justice Lanzinger has expressed similar concerns
elsewhere. See, e.g., Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Products Co., 125 Ohio St. 3d 250, 2010-Ohio1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, at ¶¶ 106-08 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part).
86. Groch, 2008-Ohio-546 at ¶ 235 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at ¶ 237. Justice Pfeifer has expressed similar concerns elsewhere. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark Cnty. Bd. of Commn’rs, 115 Ohio St. 3d 337, 2007-Ohio-5022,
875 N.E.2d 59, at ¶59 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
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interpretation of evidentiary rules.88 The Court concluded this because “a
procedural or evidentiary rule ‘does not serve as a guide to lawful
behavior.’”89 Moreover, “‘as to such rules, stare decisis has relatively
little vigor.’”90 In so holding, the majority found “Galatis must be
applied in matters of substantive law” where reliance issues may be
involved.91
Second, in State v. Bodyke, a plurality of the court, including
Justice O’Connor, held that the Galatis tripartite test was “inapplicab[le]
to constitutional claims.”92 The Court in Rocky River found that the
insurance and contract law context that arose in Galatis was different
than constitutional law.93 The Court reasoned in Rocky River that
“reconsideration of past decisions in the constitutional realm ‘is not
some forbidden aberration. It is, in fact, the fulfillment of our
constitutional responsibilities.’”94
Finally, in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, a majority of the court,
including Justice O’Connor, held that “while stare decisis applies to the
rulings rendered in regard to specific statutes, it is limited to
circumstances ‘where the facts of a subsequent case are substantially the
same as a former case.’”95 The majority held:
We will not apply stare decisis to strike down legislation . . . merely
because it is similar to previous enactments that we have deemed unconstitutional. To be covered by the blanket of stare decisis, the legislation must be phrased in language that is substantially the same as that
96
which we have previously invalidated.

After reviewing the statutes at issue in Arbino, the Court found they
were “more than a rehashing of unconstitutional statutes” and, therefore,
declined to apply stare decisis.97
V. CONCLUSION
For now, Galatis continues to provide the Ohio Supreme Court
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See State v. Silverman, 121 Ohio St. 3d 581, 2009-Ohio-581, 906 N.E.2d 427, at ¶ 33.
Id. at ¶ 32 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)).
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 719 (1955)).
See id. at ¶ 31.
State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St. 3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶¶ 34-36.
See id. at ¶ 35.
Id. at ¶ 36.
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶

96.
97.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 24.

23.
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with a standard for determining when judicial precedent will be
overruled or modified. But change within the law continues. In 2010,
Chief Justice Moyer unexpectedly passed away, and Chief Justice
O’Connor was soon elected to the post. Three years later, for only the
second time since World War II, the high court saw three new Justices
arrive: Judith French, Sharon Kennedy, and William O’Neill.
Confronted with a similar situation 65 years ago, Justice William O.
Douglas observed:
When only one new judge is appointed during a short period, the unsettling effect in constitutional law may not be great. But when a majority of a Court is suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be substantial unsettlement. There will be unsettlement until the new judges have
taken their positions on constitutional doctrine. During that time—
which may extend a decade or more—constitutional law will be in
flux. That is the necessary consequence of our system and to my mind
98
a healthy one.

It remains to be seen how these new Justices will impact the Galatis
test. However, whatever criticisms its detractors may have, Chief Justice
O’Connor’s approach in Galatis has provided a fairly straight-forward
analytical tool for considering the overruling of precedent where
previously there was none. In doing so, it has provided both
predictability and flexibility. If further change is considered, the
“predictability” wing of stare decisis suggests that any new standard
must retain sufficient definition to make overruling judicial precedent
the exception and not the rule. To hold otherwise would be detrimental
to the rule of law in Ohio.

98. Douglas, supra note 44, at 736-37. With the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Douglas did not have to deal with judicial elections potentially changing the composition of the
court every few years.
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